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The research project reported here is based on a team effort that included other 
Naval Postgraduate School faculty in addition to the authors of this report. Bob Barrios- 
Choplin, Alice Crawford, Reuben Harris, and Sterling Sessions conducted field 
interviews and contributed to the development of the survey used to assess the skills and 
com-petencies required for Naval installation management. 
ABSTRACT 
Two studies of the job demands of installation management are reported here. In 
Study 1, U.S. naval officers and civilians were interviewed regarding the knowledge and 
skill requirements of installation management. Seventeen "core" competency areas were 
extracted from these interviews and formed the basis of a survey administered to a sample 
of current installation commanding officers in Study 2. The survey focused on officers' 
perceptions of each area's importance and of their level of preparation in each area. The 
results of both studies strongly suggest naval installation commanders desire and require 
more extensive and specialized education and training in the competency areas prior to 
assuming command of an installation. 
INTRODUCTION 
Background 
There are over 400 military installations worldwide. With assets in excess of $2.5 
billion and an annual budget of roughly $100 million, the typical naval installation 
provides services and facilities to about 12,000 sailors, family members, civilian 
employees, and retirees (ICIM, 1996a). Regardless of installation size, the provision of 
services and facilities occurs in an increasingly complex managerial environment. 
Budgetary belt-tightening, environmental regulations, outsourcing demands, and media 
scrutiny combine with a host of other factors to challenge the installation commanding 
officer's (CO) knowledge and skills. Despite the enormous fiscal responsibility and 
managerial challenges of operating a military installation, these officers receive little 
training prior to assuming command. According to the Installation Corporate Information 
Management Group (ICIM): "In no other major area, have OSD [Office of Secretary of 
Defense] and the Services and Agencies been so apathetic toward management and the 
preparation of managers" (1996a). 
The ICIM was instituted by the Department of Defense (DoD) in an effort to 
identify, standardize, and streamline military installation services and to develop 
evaluation metrics for both services and facilities (ICIM, 1996b). Although it 
acknowledges the need for increased management training among existing and potential 
installation commanders, ICIM has not begun to explore the day-to-day knowledge and 
skill requirements of a military installation commander. That is the purpose of this 
research project. 
In February 1996, Dr. Bernard Rostker, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for 
Manpower and Reserve Affairs, directed the Department of Systems Management at the 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) to assess the preparation required for base management 
in a complex and changing environment. This research examines the collective 
experiences of naval installation commanding officers to determine (a) the knowledge 
and skill areas (KSAs) pertaining to base/installation management, and (b) commanders' 
perceived level of preparation in those areas. Two research questions guided the project 
design: 
RQ1:   What knowledge and skill areas are critical for successful installation 
management? 
RQ2:   To what extent do installation commanders feel they are prepared in the 




This report presents the results of two studies conducted by NPS faculty. Study 1 
is a qualitative analysis of data gathered from semi-structured interviews of current and 
prior naval installation commanding officers and staff. Its intent is to explore the range of 
competencies required for successful installation management, and further, to begin to 
assess any "preparation gaps" in those competencies, as expressed by the officers 
themselves. The knowledge and skill competencies extracted in the analysis form the 
basis for a survey developed in Study 2. The survey addresses the relative importance of 
the core competencies and allows commanders to indicate their level of preparation in 
each competency area. Study 2 reports the survey results for current Navy installation 
commanding officers. A general discussion section for both Study 1 and Study 2 
concludes the paper. 
Study 1. 
Sample 
There are approximately 90 Navy installations in the continental U.S. (CONUS). 
In order to achieve a representative sample of the overall population of Navy installations 
in CONUS, those areas of CONUS with the highest concentration of Navy installations 
were specifically targeted for visits by NPS research teams. Table 1 shows the commands 
visited. 
Table 1. Interview Sites 
Geographic Region Command 
Northeast Portsmouth (NH) Naval Shipyard 
Central Atlantic Coast NS A Norfolk 
NavSta Norfolk 
Amphib. Base Little Creek 
Pentagon 
Southeast NAS Pensacola 
NAS Jacksonville 
NSA Jacksonville 
Southwest NavSta San Diego 
NSA San Diego 
NAS North Island 
Amphib. Base Coronado 
Central Pacific Coast Naval Postgraduate School 
Table 1. Interview Sites, cont. 
Geographic Region Command 
Northwest NavSta Everett 
SubBase Bremerton 
NSA Bangor (WA) 
Within the areas of greatest concentration, 34 current or prior naval installation 
commanding, executive, and staff officers/civilians were selected and personally 
interviewed regarding their perceptions of the critical knowledge and skill areas required 
to run a military installation. Civilian and military staff included environmental liaisons, 
Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) and Public Works directors, housing officers, 
and legal officers. In one case, the interviewee (a current CO) assembled most of his staff 
for a brief question-answer period with the interviewers, but these staff members are not 
included in the total count because they were not individually interviewed.   The sample 
consisted of 
3 flag officers (1 CO), 
10 current COs, 
4 previous COs, 
2 executive officers (XOs), 
15 staff officers/civilians. 
Method 
Researchers from the Naval Postgraduate School conducted a series of 
progressively structured, face-to-face interviews. Working in pairs and triplets, portions 
of the research team arranged to visit officers at their current commands and, when 
schedules permitted, the team also arranged to interview staff and prior commanding 
officers in the vicinity. 
Interviews consisted of primarily open-ended questions addressing officers' 
perceptions about critical competency areas in base management and the extent of their 
preparation in those areas. Our intent was to elicit as much information as possible from 
interviewees about their shore command preparation and experience without resorting to 
a tightly structured interview schedule which might limit responses or result in 
overlooking a unique but important competency area. To facilitate candid discussion, 
interviews were not tape-recorded, although researchers did take extensive notes on each 
officer's experience and perceptions. A progressively structured approach was adopted in 
which the officers were first asked to compare their shore command responsibilities to 
those of their previous assignments, which in many cases included mission command. As 
the interview progressed, commanders were encouraged to expand on both the breadth 
and depth of competencies discussed, and to indicate the extent and quality of their 
formal preparation in those areas prior to assuming command. Finally, officers were 
asked about specific competencies not mentioned in order to assess whether their 
omission was due to oversight or perceived lack of importance. 
Upon returning to NPS, individual researchers prepared reports that enumerated 
those knowledge and skill area competencies (KSAs) identified by their interviewees. 
Using inductive content analysis, the research team then collectively analyzed the 
interview reports to generate a list of common themes and items. 
From these themes, the team generated a list of common KSAs. In order to be 
retained, a KSA had to be confirmed by two or more researchers using independent 
interviews as the basis for confirmation. The researchers then collapsed categorically 
related or semantically identical KSAs into one "umbrella" KSA. For example, under the 
rubric of "Financial Issues" are several related KSAs such as budget-balancing, reading 
financial statements, cost accounting, cost containment, understanding where funding 
originates, resource allocation, economic forecasting, retailing, and so on. 
Results 
Themes 
Some notable trends and recurring themes surfaced from the interviews. One 
hundred percent of our interviewees brought up the importance of financial matters, and 
this usually occurred very early in each interview. Most officers felt they needed further 
preparation in this area. Some of the comments are illustrative: 
[I] can't manage with the Navy accounting system: The purchase of desk chairs 
is lumped into the costs of running a tug-boat 
We need to know accounting for executives. What is gross, net, depreciation ? 
What do I look for in an analysis? What is the fair market commercial rate? 
How much is a square foot? 
The challenges have to do with budgets, dealing with diverse tenants and trying 
to provide good service.... We must do lots of analysis to figure tradeoffs of 
spending on some things as compared to others. 
Staffing also surfaced as a critical issue. Interviewees stressed the need for fully 
qualified staff. Particularly well-regarded were the civilian staff (e.g., environmental, 
legal) who were experts in their field and not subject to rotation every two to three years. 
Such reliance on civilian continuity does not come without costs, however. As one 
officer observed, "Three year turnovers place the institutional memory in the hand of 
the civilian bureaucracy." Still, a good staff is vital, but useful only if one has "a 
working knowledge to understand the principles and basic concepts to ask intelligent 
questions." 
There was complete agreement on the issue of civilian personnel management. 
"Fifty percent of what a CO does is a personnel type of decision," said one respondent, 
noting that he was not particularly well-prepared for the challenge. Another officer 
confirmed that his operational experience left him ill-prepared for dealing with civilians: 
"the biggest transition for me was civilian personnel. My only previous experience was 
in a shipyard even though I had been in the Navy for 17 years." According to one 
interviewee, managing civilian personnel is the number one challenge for both the CO 
and the XO: "Personnel management from the military side is not a problem because 
we have the tools. From the civilian point of view, we don't have the tools." Even the 
familiar Morale, Recreation, and Welfare (MWR) department seems daunting from the 
new shore commander's point of view. One officer observed that a colleague's "biggest 
challenge was the Child Development Center - he owned it His biggest fear was child 
abuse." 
Many of the problems associated with critical KSAs like personnel issues arise 
from making the transition from air and sea command to shore command, or from 
operations-based assignments to installation management. For example, many officers 
cited steep learning curves for legal and environmental issues and responsibilities, tenant 
and facilities management, outsourcing and contracting. "It takes a long time to figure 
out what is apriority and what isn % " said one officer. "After about two years, you 
finally know what to pay attention to, then you have one more year do it and you have 
learned from the problems of the past two years," commented another. Consequently, 
the solution for many was to merely observe and learn rather than attempt to manage from 
a position of ignorance. As one CO stated, "The first 6-9 months I just stayed out of 
the way and tried not to be an obstacle." This was a common strategy, especially among 
those officers who discovered their operational training and experience did not adequately 
prepare them for macro-level management. This "on-the-job training," from the CO on 
down to the S-l (admin) desk clerk, "perpetuated inefficiencies" and "preserved the 
status quo," observed one CO. Furthermore, it promoted reactive, rather than proactive 
management. Another agreed with this assessment and offered the following example: 
You learn so much from experience. For example, an oil spill is moved by tide 
over to Coronado and all the ducks die. That's not the time to get the call You 
need to put into place preventive procedures, etc., but you seem to have to learn 
from accidents. 
Reactive management not only has the potential to undermine the CO's 
credibility, but it also could place base-community relations at risk. Many COs cited 
the strategic nature of developing, maintaining, and enhancing those relations. A key 
concern, according to one officer, was finding "innovative ways of partnering with the 
community." Particularly problematic for the new CO was recognizing the status of the 
current base-community relationship and finding metrics for evaluating those 
relationships. Others found their installations in a "state of siege" by communities more 
interested in getting rid of them than partnering. They wanted help in overcoming these 
negative relations. A healthy relationship between base and community "makes things a 
lot easier" said one CO. 
An issue frequently mentioned was the commanding officer's presence as a 
leader in the community. As one stated, "from the mayor and the city council on 
down they all want to talk with 'the man' [base CO]." This requirement puts enormous 
time demands on the CO. "A typical day consists of 6-9 scheduled events," observed 
one officer, and "most don't understand how much time is consumed..." "The average 
day is twelve hours," said another. In keeping with the CO's high-visibility role, several 
officers noted the need for explicit training in dealing with media, and especially crisis 
management. As one stated, "the media is one of my greatest concerns." Another 
described his frustration because he "had no previous exposure to public affairs," and 
then he had to contend with "irresponsible reporting by the media." More than one 
officer suggested that training involving role-playing techniques would be helpful in 
dealing with high media visibility. Another wanted additional staff to contend with the 
media: "We have a $300 million business with demanding capabilities in managing the 
media and I have a [public affairs staff of 2] compared to the Lockheeds of the world." 
A number of officers expressed concerns about managing and using new 
communication technology. These concerns ranged from an outright plea for hands-on 
computer instruction ("There's no training for using technology") to larger systemic 
concerns, such as the technological disparity, in terms of both training and resources, 
among installations ("I have people in 25 buildings and can't talk to them with a 
computer"). The current national emphasis on using communication technology to 
facilitate learning and distributed work serves to underscore what they see as a serious 
lack of skills and resources at the management level in Navy base operations. 
In commenting on their larger role, officers tended to characterize running an 
installation as similar to running a city or town, with caveats like "there's always the 
mission to consider," and "no city manager owns a grocery store, gas station, 
bowling alley, and day care center."  One officer described the CO/XO positions: 
"Our jobs are like being mayor and vice mayor. We provide good service and deal with 
egos without pissing people off." Running a Navy base, however, is not like running a 
ship, sub, or squadron. One officer made the distinction that the "shipboard 
environment is very structured" compared to the shore environment. Another offered 
more detail. Running an installation, he said, 
... is the most difficult management position in the Navy. The skipper of a 
carrier has one main objective: to get underway on time, every time and safely. 
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Everyone does what the CO tells them; they are all focused on the bridge, and 
the tasks they do are routine. The CO of a shore command has multiple 
objectives. On base, every day is different. 
One CO observed that shore commanders have different approaches, even 
different philosophies, toward shore command, and that this is largely contingent on the 
officer's training and experience: 
There are two types of base commanders. Some see the command as mayor of a 
city. Cocktailparties, gladhanding, etc.. They may have a broad overview but 
they don't understand anything. The other is the city manager who clearly 
understands how to run a city. 
All commanding officers attended the Prospective CO School (PCO), a three- 
week-long intensive overview of the responsibilities of shore command. Some likened it 
to a "firehose" in terms of breadth and depth of information in a short period of time. 
Others felt it provided a good overview of what to expect. Some people with prior 
preparation (e.g., XO experience or managerial/administrative education) said they felt 
they got more out of the PCO course because of their prior preparation.   While the 
officers we interviewed both praised and condemned the PCO School, they generally 
agreed that it was insufficient preparation for the realities of modern base management. 
A final theme from the installation COs was their sense of being "second-class." 
They felt they did not receive the pay, training, and support commensurate with the 
responsibilities of the job. For example, base commanders do not receive the Command 
Responsibility Pay (CRP) that ship and air wing commanders get, even though the base 
CO's "management scope is tenfold compared to theirs," said one CO. The pay 
discrepancy may, in part, account for the perception that "even though the level of 
responsibility is much greater than it is for war fighters, it's not recognized as such," 
said another. "They think it's easy!" one officer commented, noting that "the same logic 
applied to ship drivers and aviators (Le., lots of training) is not applied to base 
commanders." 
KSAs 
Seventeen knowledge and skill areas considered "basic" to Navy installation 
management were extracted from the interview data: Finance, Management 
Information Systems, CIVPERS, Environmental Regs, Legal Matters, Facilities 
Management, Materiel Management, Media Relations, Community Relations, 
Contracting & Outsourcing, Leadership, Managing Change, Organizational 
Redesign, Strategic Planning, Urban Planning, Performance Evaluation, and MWR. 
These KSAs are described below, including some of the specific skill and knowledge 
requirements which comprise the larger core categories. 
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The knowledge and skill requirements comprising the Finance KSA run the 
gamut of purely "business" skills relating to better service delivery and informed 
decision-making, to purely "Navy" skills relating to resource origination and allocation. 
For example, most officers indicated they spend a substantial portion of their time reading 
and trying to understand the various financial reports generated for the purposes of both 
monitoring installation activities and making resource allocation decisions. Key to their 
understanding, aside from a thorough grounding in traditional corporate accounting and 
financial procedures, was an adequate picture of the "Navy's way" of generating base 
operating funds and the restrictions on use of those funds. 
The Management Information Systems KSA reflects managing both 
information and the new technologies for doing so. Skills include obtaining and 
prioritizing information for decision-making; maintaining information networks among 
staff, colleagues, and higher-level commands; monitoring new developments in 
technology and assessing their desirability; and simply, how to use new computer 
technologies such as e-mail, teleconferencing, and graphic presentation programs. 
The issue of Civilian Personnel elicited a "wish list" of desired knowledge,  . 
primarily because most new installation COs have little experience dealing with civilian 
employees. Included in this list are labor and contract negotiations; employee 
recruitment, evaluation, training, and discipline. 
While most interviewees agreed that a top-notch staff was the critical element in 
coping with Environmental Issues, they also expressed the need to better anticipate 
issues that may arise during their tenure. Additionally, they require a full understanding 
of the impact of regulatory compliance (and non-compliance) on base operations. More 
specifically, they need to be aware of both local and state-level regulations pertaining to 
their locale and operations. 
Much like environmental issues, Legal Matters require understanding of both 
local and higher-level jurisdictions and processes which may impact base operations and 
personnel. The CO does not require exhaustive legal knowledge, but does require a 
working knowledge of jurisdictional boundaries as well as an awareness of potential 
conflicts of interest and their legal implications. 
For Facilities Management, the installation CO does not require detailed 
knowledge of the workings of the physical plant and its maintenance; however, several 
respondents indicated they do need some background in reading "specs" and in 
construction funding processes. 
Materiel Management, much like Facilities Management, does not entail 
detailed knowledge of the workings of machinery or supply of durable and non-durable 
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goods. Instead, the CO requires a broad-brush overview of cost management and supply 
logistics in order to effectively monitor base operations. 
The area of Media Relations tapped a well of uncertainty among interviewees. 
While almost none of the officers interviewed had been tested by a "hostile media" 
incident, most were concerned about that eventuality and their lack of coping skills. 
Several had experienced inadequate or inaccurate reporting, generally viewed the local 
press as adversarial, and desired strategies for taking a more proactive stance with the 
media. The other primary skill required in this area is public speaking. 
Community Relations deals with enhancing a positive relationship or 
overcoming a negative image in the community. The interviewees stressed an ongoing 
need to find new ways to interact positively with local government and community 
agencies such as law enforcement and education, as well as with the public at large, 
without compromising the mission or base operations. This area is closely related to 
Legal Matters, as the CO must avoid conflicts of interest in accepting invitations to 
participate in the activities of public-interest groups, or in issuing invitations to use 
government facilities for such activities. 
Knowledge of Contracting and Outsourcing processes and procedures, for 
example bidding and negotiating, has become imperative at the local (installation) level. 
Installation operations are increasingly outsourced to independent and civilian contractors 
in an effort to reduce infrastructure costs.   A deeper understanding facilitates the 
commander's role as partner in this process, and potentially safeguards the government 
against allegations of abuse. 
Running a Navy installation often requires new Leadership skills, or at least new 
variations of existing skills. These include interpersonal skills such as motivating and 
persuading, resolving conflicts, facilitating meetings and understanding group dynamics, 
listening, and communicating orally and in writing. 
While treated as separate areas, Managing Change and Strategic Planning are 
closely allied. The need for change is sometimes imposed from without, and sometimes 
identified from within. Both require transition planning and close monitoring of impacts 
on the mission, operations, and personnel. Successful strategic planning often anticipates 
change, and also includes monitoring the environment and planning for future needs. 
Skills such as model testing, forecasting, and decision-making are particularly useful in 
this area. 
Operating a Navy base in a climate of change and complexity often calls for 
Organizational Redesign. An effective manager is able to rearrange people, tasks, 
structure, and processes as necessary to meet base objectives. This entails flexibility and 
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a broad understanding of the essential elements interacting in the operation of the 
organization. 
Urban Planning is optimizing land use within the constraints of government 
regulations at all levels. Many installations are in periods of extensive growth in terms of 
new facilities or reuse of old ones. The installation commander often plays a decisive 
role in base use and reconfiguration. 
Several interviewees cited the need for improved metrics and standards for 
Performance Evaluation. Furthermore, some gave evidence of developing and 
implementing their own metrics, implying that this was a useful skill for monitoring 
operations and targeting areas of needed change. 
Finally, there is no area so heavily "business-oriented" as MWR, nor, with the 
exception of mission support, one so "service-oriented." Required here is understanding 
of basic business practices (e.g., profit and loss) and resource generation used in programs 
and services provided for the morale and welfare of the base population. 
Summary 
A broad body of core competencies required for base management emerged from 
Study 1. Quite literally, the installation CO is viewed as a leader, a landlord, a city 
manager, a mayor, a media figure, and CEO of a business rivaling some of the world's 
largest corporate entities in size and budget. Furthermore, the majority of officers we 
spoke with were dissatisfied with the extent of training and preparation offered for such a 
complex job, one in which they are highly visible and bear a significant amount of 
personal liability. 
While there were some indications of varying degrees of importance attached to 
the specific KSAs, none of the KSAs reported were regarded as unimportant by our 
sample. In order to gauge the relative importance of the competencies, and to further 
validate the perceived "knowledge gap"of commanding officers, we decided to develop a 
survey based on these results and administer it to the current population of CONUS Navy 
base commanders. This effort is reported in Study 2. 
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Study 2. 
Seventeen knowledge and skill areas (KSAs) considered critical to successful 
installation management were extracted from interviews conducted in Study 1, along with 
strong indications that (in retrospect) better preparation would have enabled the 
commanding officers (COs) to achieve their expected and desired level of effectiveness 
and efficiency in a shorter amount of time. The KSAs are Finance; Management 
Information Systems; Civilian Personnel; Environmental; Legal; Facilities 
Management; Materiel Management; Media Relations; Community Relations; 
Contracting; Leadership; Change Management; Organizational Redesign; Strategic 
Planning; Urban Planning; Performance Evaluation; and MWR, as reported in 
Study 1. 
Method 
A survey was developed in which respondents were asked to rate the importance 
of the 17 KSAs as well as their perceived degree of preparation prior to assuming 
command. The following scales were used, respectively: 
IMPORTANCE PREPARATION 
Very Somewhat Not Well Somewhat       Not 
Important      Important        Important     Important Prepared        Prepared     Prepared      Prepared 
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
Respondents were also asked to provide a copy of their professional biography 
which was used to determine what, if any, advanced degrees were held, along with rank if 
it was not clear from the survey. Primary MOS designators (P codes/designators) were 
obtained for all respondents using NAVPERS 15018D (the 1993 "Blue Book;" the 1100 
designator has since been changed to 1700). Installation size was obtained from aN-46 
listing of all Navy installations (descriptors were small, medium, large, and admin.). 
Mission type was self-reported by respondents. Categories were air, sub, surface, 
weapons, training, and other (which included "all," admin., R&D, shipyards, etc.). 
The Sample 
Surveys were sent to current Navy installation COs in the continental U.S. 
(CONUS), Alaska and Hawaii (N=66). A total of 38 completed surveys were returned for 
an initial response rate of 59 percent. One survey was unusable, so its elimination 
reduced the return rate to 56 percent. Although we had hoped for 100 percent 
participation, the sample obtained is representative of the current population of CONUS 
Navy base COs. The primary U.S. geographic regions were represented, as were mission 
types and installation size. Sample distributions are shown in figures 1-3. 
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Figure 1. Sample Distribution by Geographic Region 
12' 
Geographic Region 
Figure 2. Sample Distribution by Mission Type 
O    2J 
Base Type 
"Other" category: admin, training, shipworks, etc. 
as «fell as 'all.' which may include sub. air, surface 
Weapons Other 
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Size 
Source: N-46 List 
Respondent's ranks were distributed as follows: Commander (05; n=2 ); Captain 
(06; n=32); Rear Admiral (07; n=3). The sample was extremely well-educated, with 
almost two-thirds of the respondents holding post-graduate degrees in areas ranging from 
physics and engineering to business, management, and public administration. COs' 
biographies which did not report advanced degrees still indicated a high level of 
continuing education in tactical and subspecialty areas. 
Results 
Relative Rankings of KSAs 
The importance ratings of KSAs ranged from a mean of 2.73 to a mean of 3.97 (on 
a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being lowest in importance and 5 being highest), indicating that 
all KSAs were perceived to be somewhat important to very important. The overall trend 
was to rate each KSA "very important." With the exception of Materiel Management 
(mean importance = 2.92) and Urban Planning (mean importance = 2.73), all KSAs were 
regarded as very important competencies for installation management. The top five 
KSAs, in terms of mean importance ratings, are Leadership, Community Relations, 
Civilian Personnel, Environmental, and Strategic Planning. 
Preparation ratings ranged from a mean of 2.11 to a mean of 3.68, indicating that 
commanding officers perceived themselves to be somewhat prepared to prepared. With 
the exception of Leadership (mean= 3.68) and Media Relations (mean= 3.00) all 
preparation ratings fell between "somewhat prepared" and "prepared."   The five 
KSAs rated lowest, in terms ofmean preparation ratings, are Urban Planning, 
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KSA Mean Min. 
Leadership 3.97 3 
Community Relations 3.73 2 
Civilian Personnel 3.62 3 
Environmental 3.62 2 
Strategic Planning 3.59 2 
Change Mgt. 3.57 3 
Media Relations 3.54 1 
Finance 3.49 2 
MWR 3.35 1 
Facilities Mgt 3.35 2 
Org. Redesign 3.30 2 
Contracting 3.27 2 
Legal 3.24 2 
Perform Evaluation 3.16 1 
Mgt Info Systems 3.14 2 
Materiel Mgt 2.92 2 
Urban Planning 2.73 1 
Contracting, MWR, Finance, and Civilian Personnel. The mean ratings of all KSAs are 
given in Tables 2 and 3. 
Table 2. Mean Ratings of KSAs in Order of Importance (highest to lowest) 


















Scale: 1 = not important  5 = very important 
Table 3. Mean Ratings of KSAs in Order of Preparation (lowest to highest) 


















Scale: 1 = not prepared   5 = very prepared 
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KSA Mean Min. 
Urban Planning 2.11 1 
Contracting 2.14 1 
MWR 2.32 1 
Finance 2.38 1 
Civilian Personnel 2.38 1 
Mgt Info Systems 2.41 1 
Perform Evaluation 2.46 1 
Environmental 2.49 1 
Facilities Mgt 2.62 2 
Legal 2.76 1 
Materiel Mgt 2.84 1 
Org. Redesign 2.84 1 
Change Mgt. 2.92 1 
Strategic Planning 2.97 1 
Community Relations 2.97 1 
Media Relations 3.00 1 
Leadership 3.68 1 
Knowledge Gaps 
Despite the experienced and highly-educated status of our sample, significant self- 
reported knowledge gaps were identified. Almost without exception, the importance 
ratings exceeded the preparation ratings to a statistically significant degree (the sole 
exception was Materiel Mgt.1). For example, officers rated Civilian Personnel as very 
important with a mean rating of 3.62, yet indicated they were only somewhat prepared in 
this area with a mean of 2.38, yielding a mean difference of 1.24 (/ =6.93, p = .00). As 
the pairwise comparisons in Table 4 indicate, the largest preparation gaps occurred in the 
following areas: Civilian Personnel (diff= 1.24), Environmental Issues and 
Contracting (diff=1.14), Finance (diffM.l), and MWR (diff=1.03). 
Table 4. Differences in KSA Importance and Preparation Ratings 





Finance/Accounting/Budget Importance:   3.49 
Preparation:   2.38 
1.1 1.02 6.60 36 .000 
Mgmt Information Systems Importance:   3.14 
Preparation:   2.41 
.73 1.05 4.25 36 .000 
Civilian Personnel Issues Importance:  3.62 
Preparation:  2.38 
1.24 1.09 6.93 36 .000 
Environmental Issues Importance:   3.62 
Preparation:   2.49 
1.14 1.00 6.87 36 .000 
Legal Issues Importance:   3.24 
Preparation:   2.76 
.49 1.02 2.91 36 .006 
Facilities Mgmt Importance:   3.35 
Preparation:   2.62 
.73 .87 5.10 36 .000 
'This exception may be partly due to the brevity of KSA descriptions in the survey (a 
copy of the survey instrument is appended). Taken strictly at face value, the necessarily brief 
description of Materiel Management may have resulted in a failure to perceive its direct or 
potential relevance to installation management. For example, Materiel Management (Mean 
importance = 2.92), described as "maintaining equipment and monitoring its life-cycle," may 
have been interpreted as more of an operational skill than a managerial one by survey 
respondents. 
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Table 4. Differences in KSA Importance and Preparation Ratings, cont. 





Materiel Mgmt Importance:   2.92 
Preparation:   2.84 
.08 1.01 .49 36 .628 
Media Relations Importance:   3.54 
Preparation:   3.00 
.54 1.04 3.15 36 .003 
Community Relations Importance:   3.73 
Preparation:   2.97 
.76 .96 4.82 36 .000 
Contracting Importance:  3.27 
Preparation:  2.14 
1.14 1.34 5.17 36 .000 
Leadership Importance:   3.97 
Preparation:   3.68 
.30 .70 2.58 36 .014 
Change Mgmt Importance:   3.56 
Preparation:   2.92 
.65 1.03 3.82 36 .001 
Organizational Redesign Importance:   3.30 
Preparation:   2.84 
.46 1.15 2.44 36 .020 
Strategic Planning Importance:   3.59 
Preparation:   2.97 
.62 1.1 3.47 36 .001 
Urban Planning Importance:   2.73 
Preparation:   2.11 
.62 1.01 3.74 36 .001 
Performance Evaluation Importance:   3.16 
Preparation:   2.46 
.70 1.15 3.71 36 .001 
MWR Issues Importance:   3.35 
Preparation:   2.32 
1.03 1.17 5.36 36 .000 
Note: results rounded to nearest 100th 
Discussion 
Differences According to Sample Subgroups 
Having established the importance of the 17 KSAs, the remaining analyses focused 
on respondents' preparation ratings and factors which might account for differences in 
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ratings, either overall, or in specific KSAs. The sample was divided according to 
geographic region, base size (N-46 categories), mission type (e.g., air, sub, training, etc.), 
officer type (P codes), rank, and education (classified as "management", "non- 
management", or "unknown" according to biographical information provided by 
respondents). Because the absence of advanced degree information in a person's 
professional biography does not necessarily confirm the lack of post-graduate work or 
degrees earned, those whose biographies lacked such information were categorized as 
"unknown." The sample consisted of 11 officers with management Master's degrees, 12 
with non-management degrees, and 14 individuals for which advanced degree attainment 
was unknown.    Means for all KSA ratings by variable groups are reported in Table 5. 
Table 5. Mean Preparation Ratings for All KSAs by Sample Sub-groups 
KSA Region Size Mission PCode Rank Edu. 
Finance NE:  2.0 Sm: 2.3 Air: 2.3 1700: 2.0 05: 2.5 Mgt:         2.5 
SE:   2.3 Med: 2.6 Sub: 2.4 llxx:2.4 06: 2.4 NonMgt: 2.8 
NW: 1.9 Lg: 2.4 Surface: 2.5 12xx: 2.5 07: 1.7 Unk:         2.0 
SW:  2.9 Admin: 1.5 Weapons: 2.0 13xx: 2.3 
HI:   2.7 Other: 2.5 other: 3.0 
MIS NE:  2.6 Sm: 2.7 Air: 2.1 1700: 2.3 05: 3.5 Mgt:          2.6 
SE:   2.4 Med: 2.2 Sub: 2.4 llxx:2.4 06: 2.4 NonMgt:  2.6 
NW: 2.2 Lg: 2.4 Surface: 2.6 12xx: 3.0 07: 2.0 Unk:         2.1 
SW:  2.6 Admin: 2.5 Weapons: 2.3 13xx: 2.2 
HI: Other: 2.9 other: 2.7 
2.0 
CIVPER NE:   1.8 Sm: 2.4 Air: 2.0 1700: 3.0 05: 2.0 Mgt:          2.5 
SE:    2.3 Med: 2.9 llxx:2.3 06: 2.4 NonMgt:   2.8 
NW: 2.3 Lg: 2.3 Sub: 2.8 12xx: 2.8 07: 2.0 Unk:          1.9 
SW:  2.5 Admin: 1.0 Surface: 2.7 13xx: 1.9 





Environment NE:  2.0 Sm: 2.1 Air: 2.2 1700: 2.0 05: 2.5 Mgt:          2.5 
SE:   2.6 Med: 3.0 Sub: 2.8 1 lxx: 2.7 06: 2.5 NonMgt:  2.8 
NW: 2.7 Lg: 2.4 Surface: 2.7 12xx: 2.8 07: 2.0 Unk:          2.3 
SW:   2.4 Admin: 2.0 Weapons: 2.0 13xx: 2.2 
HI:   2.7 Other: 2.8 other: 3.0 
Legal NE:  3.0 Sm: 2.9 Air: 2.7 1700: 2.0 05: 2.0 Mgt:          2.8 
SE:   2.5 Med: 3.0 Sub: 2.8 1 lxx: 3.1 06: 2.8 NonMgt:  2.7 
NW: 2.9 Lg: 2.7 Surface: 2.7 12xx: 3.0 07: 3.3 Unk:          2.8 
SW:  2.7 Admin: 3.5 Weapons: 2.5 13xx: 2.6 
HI: Other: 3.0 other: 2.3 
3.0 
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Table 5.       Mean Prepartion Ratings for All KSAs by Sample Sub-groups cont. 
KSA Region Size Mission PCode Rank Edu. 
Facilities NE:  2.2 Sm:       2.4 Air:           2.5 1700: 2.3 05: 2.0 Mgt:          2.9 
Mgt SE:   2.6 Med:     2.6 Sub:          2.8 llxx:2.8 06: 2.7 NonMgt:  2.7 
NW: 2.6 Lg:        2.8 Surface:    3.1 12xx: 2.3 07: 2.3 Unk:          2.4 
SW: 2.6 Admin: 2.0 Weapons: 2.5 13xx: 2.4 
HI:   3.7 Other:       2.4 other: 3.7 
Materiel NE:  2.6 Sm:       2.9 Air:           2.5 1700: 1.7 05: 2.5 Mgt:          3.0 
Mgt SE:   2.5 Med:     2.8 Sub:          3.2 llxx:3.2 06: 2.9 NonMgt:   2.9 
NW: 2.4 Lg:        2.9 Surface:    3.0 12xx: 3.0 07: 2.3 Unk:         2.6 
SW:  3.4 Admin: 2.5 Weapons: 3.3 13xx:2.4 
HI: other: 4.0 
3.7 Other:       2.9 
Media NE:   3.0 Sm:       2.7 Air:           3.0 1700:2.7 05: 2.0 Mgt:          3.0 
SE:   3.1 Med:     3.2 Sub:          2.6 llxx:3.1 06: 3.0 NonMgt:   3.0 
NW: 2.9 Lg:        2.9 Surface:    3.3 12xx: 3.3 07: 3.7 Unk:          3.0 
SW: 3.1 Admin: 3.5 Weapons: 13xx: 2.9 
HI:   2.7 2.5 
Other:       3.3 
other: 3.0 
Comm Relat NE:   3.0 Sm:       2.6 Air:          2.9 1700: 2.3 05: 3.0 Mgt:          2.5 
SE:   3.0 Med:     3.0 Sub:         2.8 llxx:3.1 06: 2.9 NonMgt:   3.3 
NW: 3.1 Lg:        3.1 Surface:   2.9 12xx: 3.0 07: 3.7 Unk:          3.0 
SW:   3.0 Admin: 3.5 Weapons: 2.5 13xx: 2.9 
HI: Other:      3.5 other: 3.7 
2.3 
Contracting NE:   1.4 Sm:       2.1 Air:          1.8 1700: 2.0 05: 2.0 Mgt:          2.2 
SE:    1.8 Med:     2.3 Sub:         2.2 llxx:2.2 06: 2.2 NonMgt:   2.5 
NW: 2.3 Lg:        2.1 Surface:   2.6 12xx: 2.8 07: 1.7 Unk:          1.8 
SW:  2.5 Admin: 1.5 Weapons: 2.0 13xx: 1.6 
HI:   2.7 Other:      2.4 other: 3.7 
Leadership NE:  3.4 Sm:       3.7 Air:           3.6 1700: 3.3 05: 3.5 Mgt:          3.8 
SE:    3.5 Med:     3.6 Sub:          3.4 llxx:3.8 06: 3.7 NonMgt:   3.6 
NW: 3.7 Lg:        3.7 Surface:    3.9 12xx: 4.0 07: 3.3 Unk:          3.6 
SW:   3.9 Admin: 3.5 Weapons: 4.0 13xx: 3.5 
HI: Other:       3.6 other: 4.0 
4.0 
Change Mgt NE:   3.2 Sm:       2.7 Air:           2.8 1700: 2.0 05: 2.0 Mgt:          3.2 
SE:    2.7 Med:      2.4 Sub:          3.2 llxx:3.2 06: 3.0 NonMgt:  2.6 
NW: 2.7 Lg:         3.2 Surface:    3.3 12xx: 2.8 07: 2.7 Unk:          3.0 
SW: 3.1 Admin: 3.5 Weapons: 2.5 13xx: 2.8 
HI:    3.0 Other:       2.9 other: 3.7 
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Table 5.      Mean Prepartion Ratings for All KSAs by Sample Sub-groups cont 
KSA Region Size Mission PCode Rank Edu. 
Org. NE: Sm:        3.0 Air:           2.6 1700: 1.7 05: 2.0 Mgt:          2.7 
Redesign 2.6 Med:      2.6 Sub:          3.0 llxx:3.1 06: 2.9 NonMgt:  2.7 
SE:    2.8 Lg:         2.8 Surface:    3.0 12xx: 3.3 07: 3.0 Unk:          3.0 
NW: 2.3 Admin:  3.5 Weapons: 13xx: 2.6 
SW:   3.2 2.8 other: 3.7 
, HI: Other: 
3.3 3.0 
Strategic NE:   3.0 Sm:       3.3 Air:           2.8 1700: 1.7 05: 3.0 Mgt:          2.9 
Planning SE:    2.5 Med:     2.6 Sub:          3.0 llxx:3.3 06: 3.0 NonMgt:  2.8 
NW: 2.7 Lg:        3.0 Surface:    2.9 12xx: 3.3 07: 3.0 Unk:          3.1 
SW:   3.4 Admin: 3.5 Weapons: 13xx: 2.6 
HI: 3.5 other: 4.0 
3.7 Other:       3.1 
Urban NE:   2.2 Sm:       2.0 Air:           2.0 1700: 1.3 05: 2.5 Mgt:          2.4 
Planning SE:    2.1 Med:      1.8 Sub:          2.4 llxx:2.4 06: 2.1 NonMgt:  2.3 
NW:  1.9 Lg:        2.3 Surface:    2.6 12xx: 1.5 07: 1.7 Unk:          1.8 
SW:   2.1 Admin: 2.0 Weapons: 13xx: 2.0 
HI: 2.0 other: 3.0 
2.7 Other:       1.8 
Perform. NE:   1.8 Sm:       2.7 Air:           2.3 1700: 2.3 05: 3.0 Mgt:          2.5 
Eval. SE:    2.5 Med:     2.0 Sub:          2.8 llxx:2.6 06: 2.5 NonMgt:  2.5 
NW: 2.1 Lg:        2.6 Surface:    2.7 12xx: 2.5 07: 2.0 Unk:          2.4 
SW: 2.6 Admin: 2.0 Weapons: 2.3 13xx:2.2 
HI:    3.3 Other:       2.4 other: 3.0 
MWR NE:   1.6 Sm:       2.6 Air:           2.2 1700: 1.7 05: 2.0 Mgt:          2.5 
SE:    2.6 Med:     2.0 Sub:          2.4 1 lxx: 2.5 06: 2.4 NonMgt:   2.3 
NW: 2.0 Lg:        2.4 Surface:    2.7 12xx: 2.3 07: 1.7 Unk:          2.1 
SW:   2.4 Admin: 2.0 Weapons: 13xx: 2.2 
HI: 2.0 other: 3.0 
3.0 Other:       2.3 
To conduct further analysis, each respondent's preparation ratings were summed to 
form an overall preparation index. Index scores for the sample ranged from a low of 29 
(min. possible=17) and a high of 62 (max. possible = 68). This index was used in 
analyses of variance to determine whether significant overall differences in KSA 
preparation ratings existed among the various sub-groupings mentioned above. The 
results are reported in Table 6. 
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Table 6. Analyses of Variance. Preparation Index by Geographic Region, Base Size, 
Mission Type, Officer Type, Rank, and Education 
Prep Index n Mean sd Source SS df MS F 
by levels of 
Region: 
NE 5 41.40 7.50 
SE 11 43.82 7.92 between 383.35 4 95.84 
NW (incl. AK) 7 42.57 7.66 within 2197.94 32 68.69 1.40 
sw 11 48.45 9.21 total 2581.29 36 
HI 3 51.67 8.50 
Size: 
Sm. 7 44.57 6.08 between 29.07 3 9.69 
Med. 9 44.44 9.49 within 2552.22 33 77.34 .1253 
Lg. 19 46.11 9.34 total 2581.29 36 
Admin. 2 43.50 6.36 
Mission: 
Air 13 42.23 8.02 
Sub 5 47.00 9.79 between 289.38 4 72.35 
Surface 7 49.14 11.5 within 2291.91 32 71.62 1.01 
Weapons 4 42.75 4.35 total 2581.29 36 
Other 8 47.00 6.39 
Officer Type: 
1700 3 36.33 4.62 
1110-1140 13 47.92 6.99 between 967.46 4 241.86 
1210-1240 4 47.75 7.72 within 1613.84 32 50.43 4.80** 
1310-1320 14 41.50 7.56 total 2581.30 36 
other (eng., LDO) 3 57.00 5.57 
Rank: 
05 2 42.00 4.24 between 61.83 2 30.91 
06 32 45.78 8.89 within 2519.47 34 74.10 .4172 
07 3 42.00 5.20 total 2581.30 36 
Education: 
mgmt degree 11 46.55 7.83 between 116.32 2 58.16 
non-mgmt degree 12 46.75 8.71 within 2464.97 34 72.50 .8022 
unknown 14 43.00 8.85 total 2581.29 36 
*p<.05   **p<.01 
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Based on Table 6, we find no overall differences in preparation ratings among 
different geographic regions, base sizes, mission types, or educational backgrounds. 
However, as Table 6 also shows, officers differed in preparation according to their P 
codes. Post hoc analysis of the significant differences among officer types revealed that 
self-reported preparation ratings differ between the two groups comprising the 1700 and 
13xx (air) communities and the 3 groups comprising other naval communities (generally 
surface, sub, and engineering). There does not appear to be any overall distinction 
between warfare and non-warfare officers. 
There are other significant differences in specific KSAs as well. They are reported 
in the next section. 
Preparation Ratings in Specific KSAs 
Bearing in mind that it is not our intention to isolate any Naval community as more 
or less prepared and that all officers in our sample indicated that they were less than 
optimally prepared, the purpose of this section is to explore any factors which may have 
an impact on an officer's reported level of preparation in specific KSAs. Presumably, the 
two primary factors are career experience and education. A third factor, base size, was 
also tested because of varying degrees of complexity associated with managing larger 
bases (as reported by the COs interviewed). 
Base size, education, and P designator were used as independent variables in one- 
way analyses of variance with each KSA preparation rating as the dependent variable. No 
significant differences were observed in the analysis of base size. Significant results for 
education are shown in Table 7. 
Table 7.       Significant Differences in KSA Preparation Ratings by Education 




Mgt. 11 2.45 .82 within 2 3.73 1.862 3.34 .05 
Non-Mgt. 12 2.75 .75 between 34 18.98 .5582 
Unknown 14 2.00 .67 total 36 22.70 
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Table 7.       Significant Differences in KSA Preparation Ratings by Education cont. 
KSAby 
Levels of 



























Note: P code categories in bold indicate source of significant differences according to post hoc Scheffe 
test. 
As shown in Table 7, education accounts for significant preparation differences in 
preparation ratings in only two areas: Finance and Civilian Personnel. Moreover, these 
differences are attributable to those whose educational backgrounds are highly specialized 
(e.g., engineering) rather than in management. This finding is surprising and difficult to 
account for, especially given the small sample size. We might speculate that the typical 
advanced management degree is generic, not specific to base management. Also, the 
higher preparation scores of those with non-management degrees are perhaps more 
accurately attributable to the officers' operational experience with contracts, project 
budgets, and civilian contractors. This is supported by the additional finding that the 
"other" category (consisting of engineering and LDO officers) accounts for the highest 
preparation scores in Civilian Personnel, Materiel Management, Contracting, 
Organizational Redesign, Strategic Planning, and Urban Planning, as shown in Table 
8- 
Table 8.       Significant Differences in KSA Preparation Ratings by P Codes 




1700 3 3.00 1.00 within 4 9.59 2.4000 3.32 .02 
llxx 13 2.31 .85 between 32 23.11 .7223 
12xx 4 2.75 1.25 total 36 32.70 
13xx 14 1.93 .73 
Other 3 3.67 .57 
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Table 8.       Significant Differences in KSA Preparation Ratings by P Codes cont. 
KSAby 
Levels of 




1700 3 1.67 .577 within 4 12.62 3.1560 5.49 .001 
llxx 13 3.23 .599 between 32 18.40 .5751 
12xx 4 3.00 .817 total 36 31.02 
13xx 14 2.42 .938 
Other 3 4.00 .000 
Contracting by 
P code: 
1700 3 2.00 .000 within 4 12.00 3.0003 6.70 .000 
llxx 13 2.15 .689 between 32 14.32 .4476 
12xx 4 2.75 .957 total 36 26.32 
13xx 14 1.64 .633 
Other 3 3.67 .578 
Org. Redesign 
P code: 
1700 3 1.67 .577 within 4 8.59 2.1480 3.06 .03 
llxx 13 3.08 .760 between 32 22.43 .7011 
12xx 4 3.25 .500 total 36 31.02 
13xx 14 2.57 1.01 
Other 3 3.67 .577 
Strategic Plan. 
P code: 
1700 3 1.67 .577 within 4 11.57 2.8932 4.33 .006 
llxx 13 3.31 .855 between 32 21.40 .6688 
12xx 4 3.25 .957 total 36 32.97 
13xx 14 2.64 .842 
Other 3 4.00 .000 
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Table 8.       Significant Differences in KSA Preparation Ratings by P Codes cont 
KSA by n Mean sd Source df SS MS F P 
Levels of 
Urban Plan, by 
P code: 
1700 3 1.33 .577 within 4 6.82 1.7060 3.26 .023 
llxx 13 2.38 .768 between 32 16.74 .5232 
12xx 4 1.50 .578 total 36 23.56 
13xx 14 2.00 .679 
Other 3 3.00 1.00 
Note: P code categories in bold indicate source of significant differences according to post hoc Scheffe 
test. 
As seen in Table 8, not only do engineering officers consistently rate themselves as 
most prepared in all six of the significant areas, but also their ratings account for the 
differences in three of those areas: Strategic Planning, Contracting, and Materiel 
Management. Notably, the low self-reported preparation ratings of the 1700 community 
also account for differences in the areas of Materiel Management and Strategic Planning. 
Again, it is difficult to speculate on reasons for these findings because these two sample 
sub-groups sizes are especially small (n=3 and n=3) and exhibit comparatively little 
deviation within the groups. 
Unexpected Findings 
Survey respondents rated themselves as adequately prepared in Media Relations 
(mean = 3.00). This finding contradicts the expressed sentiments of the interviewees, 
who felt they could have been better prepared to deal proactively and strategically with 
the media and often suggested means for training prospective COs more effectively. 
However, most of the officers interviewed who discussed the need for better preparation 
in media relations also described incidences in which they faced adversarial media or 
inaccurate reporting. It is quite possible that fewer of the COs surveyed had this 
experience, and so did not find their skills put to the test. 
Not surprisingly, survey respondents rated themselves as well prepared in the area 
of leadership (mean = 3.68). Civilian personnel, on the other hand, was a problem area 
(mean= 2.38) and indicates a distinction being made between the concepts of military 
leadership and people management. It is possible that officers responded to the personnel 
item on the survey as a technical issue, rather than as a "people management" issue 
relating to leadership. In other words, officers may have focused more on the legal 
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aspects of hiring and working with civilians versus military personnel. Of interest is the 
finding that 1700 community respondents rated themselves as least prepared in almost 
every competency area, with the exception of Civilian Personnel (mean prep rating =3.0). 
This is an area in which the 1700 community, historically serving in administrative 
billets, may have extensive operational experience. 
We expected to find some preparation advantages among those who had reportedly 
pursued advanced education and this was so, but only in specific areas such as Finance 
and Civilian Personnel. Those without advanced degrees saw themselves at a 
disadvantage in these two competency areas. Close examination reveals further that, as a 
subgroup, engineering officers rated themselves as best prepared in these areas. 
Education may in fact have little to do with this finding. From an operational standpoint, 
these officers deal more frequently and extensively with facilities and materiel, project 
budgets and civilian contractors, so it is not surprising that they also report the highest 
preparation scores overall. 
The fact that we did not see a distinct advantage for the group with advanced 
management degrees was initially surprising. Upon further reflection however, we came 
to understand that the educational backgrounds of our sample offered no significant 
advantage in terms of preparation for assuming command of a naval installation. In other 
words, the "generic" management degree or highly specialized engineering degree is 
insufficient preparation for the demands of installation management. 
Additional Research 
More research is warranted in the area of officer perceptions of media relations and 
the high-visibility of the CO's role. The survey respondents rated their preparation quite 
high, whereas the interviewees indicated substantial concerns about their lack of 
preparation for dealing with media. 
Additional research may more thoroughly document areas where higher ranking- 
officers are deficient in new technological skills and knowledge, such as computer 
applications, networking, and distributed work. Also needed is information on the best 
ways to rectify deficiencies and to keep officers current. 
Questions arise concerning the definition of leadership among naval officers. In 
particular, how does "people management" fit into the scheme of military leadership? 
Also, how does one's conception of leadership change in transitioning from micro- 
managed operational environments to macro-level administration? 
Finally, the consistently low preparation ratings of the 1700 community are a 
matter of concern. Our findings support continued efforts to investigate gender and 
operational training and command issues such as leadership. 
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Conclusion 
We identified 17 core KSAs for installation management. The managerial purview 
of base commanding officers is broader in scope than that of "warfighting" commanders. 
Most KSAs reported in this study consists of skills and competencies which pertain 
almost exclusively to the management of military installations. Among these are finance, 
civilian personnel issues, urban planning, environmental issues, legal issues, contracting 
and outsourcing, community relations, and MWR. The warfighting operational 
experience and training which characterizes the career paths of most commanding 
officers is inadequate preparation for assuming base command. A comment appended to 
a survey response is particularly illustrative: "As [an officer] with 21 years of 
commissioned service, I was not fully prepared to deal with the technical aspects of 
running a [naval base] when I assumed command." 
Moreover, installation commanders feel the Navy is, at best, inattentive to the 
demands of the job. The extent of "on-the-job" training required of installation COs 
severely undermines their efficiency and effectiveness, while the scope of their 
responsibilities is significantly increased relative to that of officers in other command 
billets. The results reported here show that, regardless of prior experience or educational 
background, running a naval installation is a unique experience which severely tasks 
leadership, managerial, and intellectual abilities in new and, oftentimes, unexpected ways. 
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APPENDIX 
SURVEY OF KNOWLEDGE AND SKILL REQUIREMENTS OF 
INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT 
MANAGING A NAVY SHORE-BASED INSTALLATION 
NAME: 
NAME OF BASE: 
TYPE OF INSTALLATION (e.g. Sub, Air, Surface):. 
NUMBER OF PERSONNEL ASSIGNED: (mil)  
DIRECTIONS: Below you will find 16 knowlege and skill areas. Please circle the first set of numbers to indicate how 
important each area is for effective base management. Circle the second set of numbers to indicate the extent to which 
you were prepared in the knowledge and skill area prior to assuming command of your first shore-based installation. 
IMPORTANCE 
Very Somewhat 
Important    Important       Important 
4 3 2 
KNOWLEDGE AND SKILL AREAS: 
PREPARATION 
t                       Well 
portant            Prepared 










ing--generating, 4       3       2    1 4       3       2    1 
allocating, and controlling funding to accomplish 
base objectives. 
2. Management Information Systems—using 
computer technology for effective management 
of information. 
3. CIVPERS-understanding the processes and 
legal ramifications of labor negotiations, employee 
recruitment, training, evaluation, and discipline. 
4. Environmental Laws -anticipating 
environmental issues and complying with 
environmental regulations that impact base 
operations. 
5. Legal Matters -understanding the laws which 
facilitate and constrain base management decisions. 
6. Facilities Management—maintaining the 
physical plant and its connections with outside 
governmental entities. 
7. Material Management—maintaining 
equipment and monitoring its life-cycle. 
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4      3       2    1 
4      3       2    1 
4      3       2    1 
4      3       2    1 
4      3       2    1 
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4       3       2    1 
4       3       2    1 
4       3       2    1 
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Prepared Prepared Prepared 
3 2 1 
KNOWLEDGE AND SKILL AREAS: 
8. Media Relations—effectively interacting with 
the media. 
Importance 
4       3      2      1 
Preparation 
4      3      2      1 
9. Community Relations—building positive 
relationships with the community at large. 
10. Contracting/Outsourcing—establishing 
contractual relations with suppliers and reducing 
infrastructure costs through partnering. 
11. Leadership—using a set of personal skills to 
work effectively with and through others (e.g. 
conflict management, communication, motivation, 
group dynamics). 
12. Managing Change-identifying what needs 
to be changed and developing a transition plan to 
achieve it. 
13. Organizational Redesign—rearranging 
people, tasks, structure, processes, etc. for 
meeting base objectives. 
14. Strategic Planning—setting organizational 
direction based on an assessment of the 
environment, future needs, and the organization's 
ability to execute its plans. 
15. Urban Planning—optimizing land 
utilization within the constraints of government 
regulations. 
16. Performance Evaluation—Using appropriate 
measures to assess base performance. 
17. Other Area? Please Explain. 
4       3      2      1 
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18. Other Area? Please Explain. 4     3       2       1 
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